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In the Supre111e Court
of the State of Utah

w1~mNI~R KII£PE,

Plaintiff-Appellant
and Cross Respondent,
vs.

J~LI

D. LeCH1£MINANT,
Defendant-Respondent
and Cross Appellant

App(~al

)

(ca~<'

No. 10310

)

APPF~LLANT'S BRIEF
from the judgment of the Third District
Court for Salt Lake County
Hon. Marcellus K. Snow, Judge

OF NATURE OF THE CASE
rrhis is an action for an accounting upon the dissolution of a partnen:;hip, primarily for the period between
thP datP of dissolution and the completion of winding up.
Wl'Arl'EM~JNT

DISPOSITION OF CASE MADE IN LOWER COURT
The lower court entered a judgment dated November
!l, 19fi4, which provided, among other things:
I. ri1 hat the Respondent ue awarded $2,500.00 for
"pre.serving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership."
2. That a bonus of $535.00 be awarded to Paeh of
the parties.
3.

Adjudging that the lfospoudent is (•ntitled to
lutal credits of $20,101.93, less refunds of $3,(j()8.7l.

1

-t

Adjudging that tlw Respond0nt is entitled to net
credits of $16,443.22.

5. Adjudging that cornpernmtion paid to Hnth Barlow and R. L. Christensen should be allowed as partnership expense and be borne equally by the partner:s.
6. Adjudging that the fee charged by Lawn•rn:e s.
Pinnock, Certified Public Accountant, should be a partnership expense and borne el1ually by the partners.

7.

Awarding Respondent a net balancP credit of
$16,433.22 out of cash on hand of $28,'723.90.
8. The Court denied Appellant's motion to amend
the judgment of the Court dated March 12, 1964.

REILIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the following portions
of the judgment dated N overnber 9, 1964 and judgment
in his favor as a matter of law therein, or, failing that,
a new trial thereon:

1. The award of $2,500.00 to Respondent for preserving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership.
2.

The award of a bonus of $535.00 to each part:»

3. Adjudging that the Respondent is t>ntitled t(I
total credits of $20,101.9:3, less refunds of $3,()()~.ll.
4.

Adjudging that the Respondent i;,; entitled lo

net credits of $16,433.22.

2
Appellant seeh reven;al of the order of the~
L'onrt denying his motion to amend the judgment of the
r.'11nrt dated March 12, 190.+, to provide that the Hesponii1·nt pay into a special fund tlw sum of $981.96 in addi11011 to the sum of 75 lJer eeut of $9,819.03 ordered paid
11)· tlw Conrt into l:mid fund, out of ·which overcharges
111aU\' by H!•spondent from patrons of the partnership
;J10uld be repaid.
J.

tiespondent seeks reversal of the following portions
111' the judgment of the Court dated November 9, 1964,
~ncl judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or, failing
that, a new trial thereon:

1. A warding Respondent the sum of $2,500.00 for
·vreserving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership,"
11hen Respondent had asked for $5,000.00.
:2. Adjudging that <.',Ornpensation paid to both Ruth
Barlow and R. L. Christensen should be allowed as partn~rship expense and bt~ borne equally by the partners.

Ad;judging that the fee charged by Lawren(',e
'~· Pinnock, Certifi<.•d Public Accountant, should be a
partn<:>rshi p expPllS(' and hornt> (~qually by the partners.
;j,

+. Awarding Respondent a net balance credit of
out of cash on hand of $28,723.90, when Re'frnndent is entitled to more.

~U1,-t33.22

S1'A'l'El\111JN'r OF F AiC':I1~
Appellant and Hespon<lent L'.Ollllllenced business as

3
of October 1, 1940, as real estate brokers. (R-3)
lt was agreed that 50 per cent of all foes and commissions earned should be paid to the partner producing
the same, ( R-3) and the remaining 50 per eent should
be put into the profit and loss account frolll which all
<."'xpenses of operating the business should be paid, and
the balance divided elJUally Letwe(•n the partnern.

Later it was agreed that the divi:::;ion of feel:l arnl
commissions should be changed to pay to the one producing the same 50 per cent of all such fees and commissions from $1.00 to $7,:200; 52% per ('.ent of total
commissions from $7,:200 to $8,±00; 55 }Jer cent of total
commissions from $8,400 to $9,600; 57112 per cent of total
conunissions from $9,600 to $1:2,000; and GO p(~l' cent of
total commissions in excess of $12,000. (R. 292 and R301) All sums so paid in excess of GO per cent of commission earned have been com;idered as bonuses and
paid at the end of each calendar year.
Subsequent to October 1, 1943, 8tate Mutual Insurance Company of vVorcester, l\lassachuseth;, appoint
ed the partnership an agent to make real estate Joans for
it and collections of the payments thereon, and agn·ed
to pay one-half of on(" pPr cent of tlu_. total outstanding
loans belonging to State Mutual Insurance Company
each year for such collection :::;ervic(~. F'or tlw making
of such loans, loan fees were charged by the partn<'rship,
and usually collected from the borrower:::;. 'l11te rnakwg
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tlw luam; and supervising the coll(;,ctions were largely
tlii! work of the Respondent. ( H. 195) 'l1he fees for making the loans and commissions on insurance sold \Vith the
!oans were credited to the partner making them, usually
the Respondent, upon which he received 50 per cent,
[lid the remainder was put into the profit and loss acii

1·ount.
The Respondent at all times supervised the keeping of the books of the partnership. Until after the Appellant gave notice of the termination of the imrtnership,
1Deeember 30, 1962) he was unfamiliar with the books .
.\fter he had checked the books, Appellant filed suit,
alleging that the Hespondent had used for his own ill-il1vidual use and benefit sums of money exceeding his
,Jiare of the partnership income, and that he reflrned to
m·ount therefor to Appellant. (H. 1-2)
Trial wa:::; held on November Jli, December 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 19 and 20 in HJ6::L The R1:_•:::.;pondent was ordered to
11a)· to the Appellant on account thereof $-±,697.70, which
amount the Respondent paid. (R 61) In addition, in
1l1P judgment rendered on .March 12, 196-1: on this matter,
the Respondent wa:::; ordered to place in a special account
i;j per cent of $9,819.65, and Appellant was ordered to
pay into said account 25 per cent of said $9,819.65, from
11·hich ov1:_•rcharges to customers of the partnership mad(~
h)· the Respondent should be repaid, and the balance
11 ·111aining after said payments should be divided 30
jJet ('t•Ht to tl1e Hespornh•nt and C>O pl'!' cent to Appellaut.

From Exhibit P-10 placed in evidenc<-·, it aplJ('ars that
the Respondent had received 13 per c1;:mt of $9,819.G5,
plus a bonus of $981.96 thereon) and Appdlant had l'('.ceived 25 per cent of $9,819.65.
On the 26th day of December, 19G3, punmant to
stipulation of the parties, the parties each bid for all
interest of the other in and to the assets of the vartnership. After several bids had been made hy <-'ach of the
parties, the Appellant made a bid of $40,000.00, and
the Respondent refused to bid highel'. Punmant thereto,
judgment dated .March 12, 196±, provided, among other
things:
''3. Plaintiff having bid $40,000.00 for the
Defendant's interest in and to said assets and
the Defendant having refused to bid higher for
Plaintiff's interest therein, all of said assets are
hereby awarded to the Plaintiff." (R. Gl)
The judgment goes on to ::itate:
''The Plaintiff ha::i paid to the Defendant
said sum of $40,000.00, less the sum of the follm\ing amounts which the Court has found are O\\'ing from the Defendant to the Plaintiff (sums
totalling $±,697.70)" (R. 61)
The Appellant served notice of dissolution of the
partnership upon Respondent on December 30, 19G2,
to become effective February 1, 1963. Uespondent
agreed to the dissolution.
i:.,rorn January 1 19G3 to February 1 19G4 the part-

j_'

'

•'

'

'
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continued to operate tlw bm;ine88 in tlw ::;a11H:' uia11ner a::; they had done prior to notice of dissolution. On
F\·hruar~· 1, 1964, Re8pondent n-•moved from the office
~pace occupied by the partnen;hip, an<l the Appellant
took full control of the boolrn, reeord8 and other a8:sets
qf the partnership.
nel'8

On February 13, 190±, a hearing wa::; had upon Re·
spondent'::; claim for "compen8ation for his preserving
the mortgage loan aecount with State Mutual ln8urarn·(~
l'ompany'' during the period of January 1, 1963 to
~ ebruary 1, 1964, and his motion that wages paid to R
[,,Christensen and Ruth Barlow be paid by tlte Appelhrnt
instead of by the partnership for the samf• lH'riod. At
tile conclusion of the evidence, the purport of tlie evidence was discussed by the Court with counsel, during
11·hich counsel for the Respondent mack the follow i11g
>tatement:
1

"l Haid if they would be willing to invoke the
partnership agrePment all the way down the line,
we would be willing to do that."
The Court then Htated :
"All right. The Court will adopt the suggestion of l\lr. Backman that we go all the way down
the line***. Neither parhwr will receive any
special <·ompt•nsation for service8 during this
inU,rim JH•riod, all(l all of tlw f'Xpt•n::;es by whicltt'ver <h·pc.ntment incurn·d or by whom will be
lnrnpl'd togt>tl1er and dt•<lueted frow the [Jl of it
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and loss account***." (R. 244-245)
A judgment was signed by the Court on March 12
1964, pursuant to the oral memorandum decision afore-'
said, (R. GO-(i--1:) which provided, among othn thin0
O's' ao.·,,
follows:

"9. All income of each party hereto from
January 1, 1963, to February 1, 1964, is hereby ordered to be received and distributed in the same
manner as is provided by the partnership agreement and as has heretofore been rect>ived and distributed, which includes insurance renewal commissions upon which the producer thereof shall
receive 50 per ct:•nt and the remaining 50 per cent
shall be deposited in the profit and loss account,
out of which all expenses of operation by whichever department incuned or by whichever party
incurred shall be lumped together and deducted
from the profit and loss account, and the balance
shall he divided equally ancl distrihut\~d one-half
thereof to each of the parties to this action.
"11. The judgment herein enten·d eonstitutes an accord and satisfaction of all claims
each of the parties hereto has against tlw
other***."
Of the transcript of testimony taken at said hearing, more than half thereof was devoted to evidence concerning the preservation of the mortgag(_• loan a:::;set by
the Respondent. As above stated, at the eondusion of the
testimony the Court stated that neither party \\'Ould n·
ceive any special compensation for services during the

8
111 terim

period. (H. J-lj) Th<· provision of the judgrnen t
quoted, that the judgrn<•11t eonstituted an at('Ol'd and sat1~fadion of all elairns l'ad1 of the parties had against the
11 tlwr, referred particularly to Hm;pond<·nt's claim for
~pecial compensation for preserving the mortgage loan
a~set. This judgment lwtame final thirty days thL•reaft<>r.
On J um· 13 and .J urn· :2-t, 1~u-t, a hl'aring was had
npon petitions fil<•<l h~· Pad1 of the parties against the
nther for an order to show ea use directed to the other,
to sho,,· eause why lu~ shoul<l not Le punished for conternpt of court for failun· to tomply with the judgment
uf l\larch 1-±, 19li-l . .No L•vidence was adduted on thL• matter of payment of any special compensation to the Reipondent for his efforts in preserving the mortgage
loan asset of tlw partnership. At the conclusion of that
ltParing the Court indicated that he would accept brief,:;
1mly on the following matters:

1.

Contempt.

L Bonus to Le paid over and above the 50 per cent
producer's basic compensation.

:J.

'1,he salaries paid to

~1rs.

Barlo\\,'".

rrhe salaries paid to .Mr. Christensen.
'11lie Court stated:

-1:.

"rl'hese four it<->ms are the only items co11cerning the Court." (R. :3!)7)
On 8epteu1ber 1-l, lUu-±, th(· Court

gavt~

a writtl-11
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memorandum decision on the hearings of June 13 and
June 24, which included the following:
"l. rrhat the Respondent should receive the
sum of $2,500.00 for his dforts during the iwriod
January 1, 1963 to February 1, 1964 in preserving
the mortgage loan asset of the partnership.

2. The graduated bonus plan of the partim·ship may be employed in determining the counui~
sions to be allocated to each partner.
3. The compensation as heretofore paid
to both R.uth Barlow and R. L. Christensen shall
remain and be allowed as a partnership expemw
to be borne equally by the partners.
4. The fee as charged by Lawrence S. Pinnock, Certified Public Accountant, shall be a
partnership expense and paid from partnership
funds and borne equally by the partners." (R.
107-108)
Counsel for Hespondent then prepared a judgment
designated "Order" which was signed by the Court on
November 9, 1964, which provided, among other things:
"l. That the Respondent should be paid
$2,500.00 for his efforts in preserving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership.

2. Compensation heretofore paid to Huth
Barlow and R. L. Christensen shall be allowed
as a partnership expense, to be borne equally by
the partners.
3. The fee charged by Lawrence S. Pinnock,
C.P.A. shall be borne equally by the partnerf'.
4.

That each partner shall be paid $535,()0
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as a bonus.
5. That n•funds of $3,G68.7 l Hhould he paid
to the Appellant, and tlw Responcknt iH entitl(•d
to receive $1G,-:!:33.2:2 out of cash on hand in the
partnership of $28,723.98. '' ( H. 109-110)
Appellant filed a motion to amend the judgment of
the Court clatL·d Jlareh U, 19G-l-, to providt~ that the He~pondent pay into tl1l' special fund for refunds of overdiarges an additional sum of $981.9(i. The Court denied
the motion.
E'ollowing is the eviden<.'.e pertinent to the matter::;
at issue in this appeal and cross-appeal.
Before the Court commenced taking testimony at
the hearing of February 13, 19G-l-, he stated that it wm;
hi8 underHtan<ling that the only thing to be considen~d
at the hearing "is the respective service rendered to
this operation since the dissolution," to which counsel
for the Respondent answered, "Yes." (R. lG-1-)
Mr. LeCheminant was the first witness called. He
tPstified in effect that the mortgage loan business con~isted of making collections from some 600 accounts on
a monthly basis. As the payments were received at the
office, they were entered on a cash book by a clerk. The
work of seeing that the accounts are kept cunent is more
than a clerical operation. rrhat was the function he performed. During the year tlH'Y had had 81 of tlH· GOU
accountH which requi n·d rnon• or lt•ss eolledion effort

11

every month. Telephone calls were made to tl10i:;e peoplP
and in addition some letters were v.-Titten, if they w1;rp
unable to get the delinquent accounts on the tl•lephom·.
In addition, State .Mutual Insurance Company required
a delinquency statement and a statement of the reasons
for the delinquencies each month. (R. 165) A statement
was sent to the accounting department by a clerk and
'
one to the mortgage loan department which the Respondent did. State 1\1 utual Insurance Company exerted a
great deal of pressure concerning delinquencies. In addition to making collections, there was a maze of detail
necessary to maintain the mortgage loan connection.
That when Mr. Kiepe terminated the partnerhip,
State Mutual Life could have cancelled its contract with
the partnership at any time, and it was necessary to
put forth additional effort to rnalu~ sure that the accounts were properly handled.
It was necessary to call personally upon some of the
delinquent mortgagors. Respondent went to Draper on
two or three occasions and to Magna on one. He went to
Bountiful and to Centerville. During the year he made
20 to 25 personal visitations and had personal conven;ations with mortgagors. Some calls w+>re madt> after office hours, some during the day. During the year he
spot-checked 70 to 100 homes. \Vhen Mr. Saunders of
State Mutual Insurance Company was in Salt Lake City
he inspected with him probably 20 houses. (R 1U7J
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The insurance company wanted loans 011 e01m1ter·
eial properties instead of homes as tht>y had pn·viously
1.anted. It was necessary that <.'.011siderable work be done
in submitting some co1m11vr<'ial loam.; in order to keu1J
1!1L' insurance company informed that wt- \n•re at least
attempting to satisfy their requirements. During th<·
1('ar he submitted about 8 or 9 residential loans and in
addition about 11 c0111mercial loans on which he had done
r·onsiderable work. They were all turned down. ( R. Hi8)
Respondent spent at least a part of each working
day at the office on the business of maintaining the loans,
rR. 170), and he had numerous telephone calls coneerning
refinancing loans \\·hich they \Vere proeessing, and he
thought he had convinced at least 20 people to leave the
loan::; and do any additional financing some other ·way.

iR. 170)
ln the insurn.n<.'.e business they had a eashier who \Vas
also a bookkeeper, and the Rt>spondt:•nt had a secretary
who took eare of gt>iwral COIT<_•spondenee and preparation of mortgage loan papt>rs, and handled the insurance
aecoun t. ( R. 170-171)
At the beginning of 19G3, the total amount of mortgage loan business which thPy WPre servicing was close
to $7 ,000,000. ( H. 17-!:) During 196;) the submission of
luans \Vas minor, the clerical help so far as tlw secretar.'·
was conc1•rned wa~ minor, al!d th1• insurane1• i·enewab
until S<~ptt.-11tl>N, 1%:) \\ PL"l' rn·gligihll'. l•'rnrn :ilay to
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September, 1963, they had about GO policies of insmanc:·
that had to be registered and sent out to customers, and
that after that time there were some ±00. rrhey were all
renewed at practically the same time. ( R. 171)
Ruth Barlow did nothing except a ::m1all amount of
work from May to September on insurance accounts.
rrhe Respondent testified that he informed Mr. Kie1w
that he would refuse to pay any part of Huth Barlow' 8
salary, that she was not needed in the office, and that
she came there to do Mr. Kiepe's personal work (H. 17±).
The Respondent \Vas asked by his counsel what in
his opinion would be reasonable for the Court to allow
to him by way of special compemmtion to be chargeable
against Appellant. The Court interjected, "You mean
for extra services rendered during the interim period.''
(R 17 4-175) Respondent further testified that the partnership income approximated $33,000 on the mortgagr·
loan account and the insurance account, with an expense
of $10,700, so that Respondent's share of the inconw
from the mortgage loan department \Vould net $11,150,
and Appellant's would be the same. In addition, during
1963 Respondent's income from appraisal work was approximately $1,000 and approximately $110 from real
estate sales and listings; his commissions on one commercial loan was $5,600 and on two residential loan:about $350, and on personal insurance comrnission8 $800
or $900. (R. 182)
1
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Respornfont testifo·d tliat his adivitic·s i11 J9G:J wc·n~
110 different from an:· othPr :·ear so far as his mortgage
Joan busilless was eoIH.'.t~nwd. I IP worked just as hard
in UWO, 19Gl and 1U(i:2 on that phase of U1e business as
he did in J ~)(i::L Then· \ras nothing rn·w at'ter th(' dissolution of the iiartuernhi lJ in the a1110u11t of dfort that lw
µut into thr• mortgag(• loa11 businesl-l. (H. 195-l!J(i)
rJ1he partuernhip had (j00 or 700 Hl'.tOUnts. ~ach
1·ustomer madl~ a 111onthly payment, either at the eounter
or through th(' mail. Ht·spondent had nothing to do with
the receiving of payments at the counter or. through the
mail. They wen' listed and posted in the books of the
partnership by a derk. lie had nothing to do with that.
lle was then asked the follo\ving r1uestion and gave the
following answer :
"Question: Then the only thing that remains
to be dom~ is to takt• care of the delinquent payments after that and make reports to the insurance company, isn't that conect '?
"Answer:
(R. 196)

That's

substantially

eoned."

On making reports to tl1e eompany on eollections
of the delinqueneies a elerk made the reports to the ac1·ounting department and the Ht•spoud1:·nt rl'ported to tlw
mortgage loan departrnen t. (H. 197) 'l1he Hesponden t
wrott- five to S(•ven lf'tfrn.; a mouth to :State Mutual Insurance Com1Jan:· on eollL~dions. lt would take iim:-he
15 minutes to write a ldter. (H. 198)
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Appellant introduced into evidence and read intn
the record a letter dated December 19, 19G3 from State
Mutual Insurance Company to the Respondent which is
most uncomplimentary of Respondent's handling of the
mortgage loan account. (R. 203-204)
Respondent was asked if Appellant ever asked him
to take care of the mortgage loan account, to which he
answered no. He answered yes to the statement, ''You
were just as much interested in preserving that account
for yourself as you were for anybody else." (R. 205)
Mrs. Ruth Barlow was then called and testified in
substance as follows: During 1963 from February 17
to August 31, the period of time during which she was
employed by the partnership, thv Respondent arrived at
the office on the average about 9 :~30 - between 9 :00 and
10 :00 in the morning. His leaving time was at 3 :00 or
3 :30 each day. On at least two or three days a week, he
would leave about 11 :00 and come back at 1 :00. He
usually spent the time between 11 :00 and 1 :OU at the
Deseret Gym. \Vhen he left the office in the afternoon,
he usually went home or to the Desert Gym. He had
a standing appointment two days a week at 3 :00 with
Brother Jonathan at the Deseret Gym. (R. 210-211)
Respondent spent part of a morning twice a month
dictating on delinquent accounts. (R. 212) When she
was working with Respondent, he dictated reports to
State Mutual and she typed them, usually a two-page
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Jetter. It didn't take long. 8he was hi8 secretary in 1960,
19til and 1962. Hi8 coming and going during those years
1rns the ::mme as in 19G:J. ( H. 212-213)
Hespondent's mn1 rnortgagv loans whieh h(• had in the
office in 1963 amounted to $108,5G5.2-l: as of April Hi,
1963. ( R. 216)

.Mr. Kiepe testified in substanee as follows: That I
L'lllployed Mr. R. L. Christensen as an understudy to
help me in making appraisals. He did a great deal of
work in bringing UlJ to date the accounting system in the
loan account and in bringing to date the insurance polieies. I employed people to carry on the mortgage loan
business because I found tht-~re was a very bad accumulation of insurance policies which needed to be sent out.
l employed Ruth Barlo-w for that purpose. Later on
others helped in the same process. (H. 220-221).
Appellant finished $28,825 of appraisal work in 1963
and produced $3,295.00 in real estate conm1is8ions. (R.
2±2)
'1'hu8 Appellant produced $32,120.00 income during
1963 which wa8 turned into the partnership.

'l1he bonu8cs Pach earned during 1959 to and includlllg U)G2 (R. 29±) and during the period in question,
lU63, (R. 120-122) were as follows:
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Year

LeChcminan t

1959 ---------------------------·-·····-·$4,046.34

Kiepe
-$2,368.14

1960 ------------------·-···-····---·-··· 1,676.39

2,001.00

1961 ---------·-······-------······

1,862.62

1962

2,139.20

1,848.58

1,731.37

1963

908.19

2,365.9(j

rrhe earnings of the Respondl,nt and tlu~ Appellant
during the period in question, January 1, 19G:3 to Febrnary 1, 1964, were ( R. 120 and 122) :
LeCheminant
Corrunissions

Kiepe

$9,190.95

$16,479.79

908.19

2,365.9()

Share of Profits --------------·-···- 15,556.44

15,556..±-1:

Total ·-------------------------------$25,655.58

$34,402.HJ

Bonus ----------------------------------···-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AW ARD OF $2,500.00 TO RESPONDENT BY THE
JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964 IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY PLEADINGS OR FINDINGS OF FACT.

rrhe judgment designated "Order'' filed on November 9, 1964, provides as follows :
"(a) Defendant LeCherninant will receive tl1r
sum of $2,500.00 for hi~ efforts and services dming the last thirtet>n rnontlu:; in pre~·wrvinp; tlll'
mortgage loan asset of the partm·r~hip."
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There were no 1Jleading8 or I<'in<ling8 of E'act to
~upport thi8 part of the ,judgment. Said judgment of
:\uvemher 9, 19ti':!, wa8 entered purnuant to a hearing had
(In the 13th day of J mw, 19G3, which wa8 continued to
and concluded on the 2-!th of June, 19ti+. 'l'he only pleadings in that matter \\'ere petition::; for onlern to show
t•ause directed to each of the parties by the other, ordering each to ::;how cau::;e why he 8hould not be found guilty
11!' contempt for failure to abide by the judgment of the
Court entered on March 12, 1964. 'l1here was not a word
11[ evidence or other proof adduced at the hearing held
on said day::; relative to Re::;pondent's efforts in preserving the mortgage loan as::;et of the partnernhip.
lf there had been evidence on this matter, it would
have been necessary to file finding::; in ::;upport of this
part of the judgment.

As ::;tated in Gaddis lnve::;tment Con11mny vs Charles
JI. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 284:

''lt ha::; been frequently held that the failure
of the trial court to make finding::; of fact on all
material issues is reversible error where it is
prejudicial. Hall v::; Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P.
1110; Baker v::; Hatch, 70 Utah 1, 257 P. 673;
Prows vs Holley, 72 Utah -±-!-!, 271 P. 31; Simper
V8 Brown, 73 Utah 17S, 278 P. 529; vVest Vi:\
Standard E'uel Company, 81 Utah 300, 17 P.2d
292; Pike v::; Clark, 95 l 'tah 235, 79 P.2d 1010."
Appellant filed a motion for a new trial (R. 118)
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and for amendments of judgment on .N ovcmbl'r 9, 196.J:
(R. 119) in which the Court's attention was callPd to thP
fact that there had been no F,indings of Fact m Conclusions of Law entered in support of the above portion
of said judgment. (R. 118-119) The Court overruled the
motion for a new trial and filed an order denying Appellant's motion to amend. Nothing was done about making Findings of Fact.
POINT II
THE ISSUE UPON WHICH THE AWARD OF $2,500.00
TO THE RESPONDENT WAS lVIADE BY THE JUDGMENT
OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964 WAS TRIED ON FEBRUARY 13,
1964, AND WAS ADJUDGED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT
BY THE JUDGMENT OF MARCH 12, 1964, WHICH JUDGMENT HAD BECOME FINAL AND WAS RES ADJUDICATA
OF SAID ISSUE AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY OF THE
JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964.

The issue upon which the award of $2,500.00 to Respondent was made by the judgment of November 9, 1964,
was tried on February 13, 19G4. At the conclusion of tllf'
evidence, the Court ruled:
"N either partner will receive any compensation for services during this interim period.''
(R. 244-245)
A judgment was signed and filed hy tlir• Conrt pnrsuant to said ruling (R. 60-64) which provided, among
other things, as follows :
"9.

All income of each party hereto from
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.January 1 1963 to "B1 ebrnan· 1 Hl6-1 is hereby
'
. '
.
ordered to be received and distributed in the
~.;arne manner as is provided by the partnership
agreement and as has heretofore been received
and distributed.***
"11. '11 he judgrnent herein constitutes an accord an<l satisfaction of all daims each of the
parties hereto has against the other."
judgment of .March 12, 196-1 became final and
11as res adjudicata of the issue of ·whether Respondent
irns entitled to any cornpem;ation for pernerving the
mortgage loan m;set for the partnership.
l111e

8ince February 13, 196-1, no evidence has ever been
introduced thereon. To date, rww more than a year since
the judgment was entered, no motion for a nt-w trial
of the matters tried on February 13, 19G-t and on which
the judgment of March 12, 19G± was t-ntered has ever been
filed. No motion to amend the judgment or for any relief
therefrom has evt-r been filed. 'l'he judgment could not
be amended without filing a motion to amend within a
reasonable time, which in this case would not be more
than ninety days. (Rule (iO(b), Ftah Hules of Civil
Procedure).
As the Court stated m Kettner vs
~d 382, 375 P.2d 28:

~no\\·,

J 3 Utah

"We are in accord with the proposition urged
by the Dt.•fondant that the trial court has broad
discretion in granting ne\r trials and in allowing

:.n
claims un<l.t·1· Rnle 60 ( b) (rd id from judgment
or order). But this power is not without limit a
tion and cannot be exercised capriciomily or arbitrarily. It is ek•mentary that under th<• cireurnstances the general rules of procedure are binding
and that a party who has allowed the time to
move for a new trial to expire is thereafter precluded from doing so. '11 his can be avoided onlv
where it is made to appear that for one or mor.e
of the reasons specified in Rule 60 (b), .im;tice ha~
been so thwarted that equity and good conscience
demand that this extraordinary relief be granted
and the burden of showing facts to justify doing
so is upon him who seeks such relief."
Said Rule oO(b) relative to judgment provides:
"The motion shall be made within rea8onable
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3) and (4) not
more than three months after the judgment, order or proceeding was ordered or taken."
Apparently the Court took the position that he
could change any judgment entered by him at any time.
In the case of Frost vs District Court of Box 1£lder
County, 83 P.2d 737, 9ti Utah lOo, this Court quoted
with approval from Freeman on Judgments, Volume
1 of the 5th ~.Jdition, Section 141, as follows:
"As a general rule, unless control over it has
been retained in some proper manner, or a statuiP
otherwise provides, no final judgment can be
amended after the term in which it was ren<l<~red
or after it otherwise Leeome8 a final ju<lgwenl.
The po\ver of courts to conect dPrital erron
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and mispri sons and to make th(_• n~<'onl s1wak tlu,
truth by nunc pro tune amendrnents after the
term does not enable them to chang(~ their judgments in substance and in any material respect,
and this is true even though the judgment has not
been formally entered of record by the clerk
where such entry is not essential to its validity.
Consequently, it is well settled that in the absence
of a statute permitting it, the law does not authorize the correction of judicial enors, however
flagrant and glaring they may be, under the pretense of conecting clerical errors."
ln Kettner vs Hnow, 13 L~tah 2d 382, 375 .P.:2d 28,
above cited, Headnote 4 reads:
"A trial court has broad discretion in granting new trials and in allowing claims under the
rule authorizing courts to grant a party relief
from judgment within a reasonable time, not to
exceed three months after a judgment has been
rendered, hut this power cannot be exercised arbitrarily. Rules of Civil Proc(J,dun•, Rule 60(h) ."
1

On June 13, 1964, more than three months had expired after the entry of the judgment of March 12, 1963
1rhen the hearing was had \\d1ich did not include any
i:;sue of special compensation to Respondent nor a word
of evidence thereon, but upon which the Court finally
entered a judgment on .N overnber 9, 196± in favor of
Respondent for $2,500.00.
POINT III
THE AW ARD OF $2,500.00 TO RESPONDENT BY THE
JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964, IS NOT ONLY NOT
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SUPPORTED BY PLEADINGS OR FINDINGS OF FACT
BUT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE GIVEN AT
THE HEARING OF FEBRUARY 13, 1964, AND IS CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

lf for sake of argument it i8 a8smned that tl10 judgment of March 12, 19G4 had not become re8 adjudicata
before the Court reverned any part of the judgment of
March 12, 19G4 denying Respondent any compensation
for extra service8 rendered in preserving the mortgage
loan account, no such award should have been made
to the Respondent for the rea8on that the evidence adduced at the hearing of February 13, 1964 would not
support such an award. During the course of the trial
held February 13, 1964, counsel for the Respondent asked
Respondent what in his opinion would be fair compensation to be awarded to him by the Court for his service~
in preserving the mortgage loan asset. rrhe Court intPrjected:

"You mean for extra services rendered during the interim period?"
to which .Mr. Backman replied, "Yes." (R. 17-1:-175)
The Hespondent by hi8 evidence attempted to prove
that he had rendered great service to the partnership
in preserving the mortgage loan as8et, hut in fad hy his
own testimony he established that he had perfornwd no
extra services in that particular during the period .January 1, 196:3, to February 1, 1964, and a8 her0tofore
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~tated,

at the conclu::;ion of the testimony, the Court

stated:
"N eitlwr party will receive any special compensation for ~wrviees during this interim period."
(R. 245)

Punmant to said ruling, a judgment was ('ntered on
}larch u, mo±, which provided, among other things:
"ll. Tlit~ judgment herein entered eonstitutes an accord and safo:;faction of all claim::;
each of the parties hereto ha::; against ·the other."

\rhich refened partitulady to Hespondent'::; daim for
.~pecial compen::;ation for pre::;erving the mortgage loan
asset.
H.espondent testifed that hi::; activitit~s in 19G3 (the
intt>rim period) were no different from any other year
>o far as the mortgage loan business \\·as conterned. He
11orked just as hard in 19GO, 19(:)1 and 1962 on that phase
11[ tlw business as he did in 1963. There was nothing
llP\\' after the dissolution of the partnership in thL'
amount of effort that he put into the mortgage loan busi1wss. ( R. 195-196)
After testifying to the work which he did on delinquent atcounts and iu \\Titing letters to keep State Mu·
tt1al Insurance Company satisfied, and the personal calls
tliat lw made to 20 or 25 honw::; ( R. 1G7) toncerning tlw
matter of taking care of the account, hp testifit-d that

2b

all collections came into the office at the counter or
through the mail and were posted to the books, all uf
which was done by clerks. He was then asked the following question and made the following an:::;wer:
''Question : 'J1hen the only thing that remairn,
to be done is to take care of the delinquent payments after that and make reports to thP in
surance company, isn't that correct'?
"Answer:
(R. 196)

'i'hat's

substantially

correct."

On making reports to the insurance comnam lll'
1:-'
''
testified that he wrote 5 to 7 letters a month, which took
maybe 15 minutes per letter to write. (R. 198)
He was asked if the Appellant had ever asked him
to take care of the mortgage loan assd, to which he
answered no. He answered yes to the statement, "You
were just as much interested in preserving that aecount
for yourself as you were for anybody else." (R. 205)
The Respondent was paid $-!-0,000.00 by Appellant
for his interest in the partnership assets (R. 61), which
was almost entirely for the mortgage loan asset. As
above quoted, he testified that he was as much interestPd
in preserving that asset for himself as he was for anyone else. He received more for his half interest in that
asset from the Appellant than ht~ \ras willing to pay to
the Appellant for his half interest therein.
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rrhe Court ordered the intome from .January l, l 9Gi3
to ~'ehruary 1, 1964 to be distributed in the same manner
<I~ provided in the partnernhip agreement. ( H. 63) rrhis
i~ in accordance with th<c• provisions of ~edion -1:8-1-:!I,
I tah Code Annotated, 1953, relative to winding up of
a partnership after dissolution.
Respondent took care of the mortgage loan asset
111r many years before 1963, but received no special
1·1)]1lpensation therefor in addition to his fees for making
loans and co1mnissions on immran<:e written with the
loans.
'l'he amount Respondent received for his work in
1%:) was grossly excessive considering the time and effort he put into the business and the very limited amount
11'1' new commissions he brought into the partrnmship.
Ile received $25,655.58 ( R. 120, 122) for approximately
half-days' work (R. 210, 211). He brought in $8,550.00
1Jf new income (H. 182) while Mr. Kiepe brought in $32,120.00 of new income, consisting of appraisal fees and
1·1·al estate sales commissions, (R. 242) and received
.s:H,±02.19 (R. 120, 122). It was chiefly the income from
the asset for which Ap1)ellant paid $-1:0,000.00 for Respon1lPnt's half interest which resulted in the payment to
RP~pondent of $25,655.58.
Respondent's manner of "preserving the mortgage
loan asset" brought a severe reprimand from State .Muinal Insurance Company. See lettt•r of December 19,
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l 963, to Respondent. (R. 203-204)
The payment of any extra compem;ation to Hespondent finds no support in the Pvi<lenc<:>.
POINT IV
THE AW ARD OF A BONUS OF $535.00 TO EACH OF
THE PARTIES IN THE JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9,
1964 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY PLEADINGS OR FINDINGS
OF FACT, NOR BY ANY EVIDENCE, AND IS CONTRARY
TO THE EVIDENCE.

There are no pleadings or Findings of Fad supporting the award of a bonus of $535.00 to each of the parties.
On the contrary, there appears in the records the statr·
ment prepared by Lawrence S. Pinnock, Certified Public Accountant, (R. 122) for the period in question. rrliat
statement shows that the Appellant earned a bonus of
$2,365.96 and Respondent a bonus of $908.19. (R. 122)
The award of an additional bonus of $535.00 to each of
the parties would beenfit neither party. As shown in the
statement rendered by Mr. Pinnock, there \Vere certain
moneys remaining in the partnership account ont of
which payment was to be made to the parties.
If an additional $535.00 is a\varded to each of the
partners, it must come out of the moneys on hand
equally and would thus reduce the profits allowed to
each of the parties, to wit, $15,556.44, by $535.00 paeh.
Thus, neither party would receive any additional rnorn·y.

No mention was made in the Court's rnemoranduw
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decision of a bonus of $;);)5.UO or an:· amount. (R. 107108)
POINT V
THAT PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER
9, 1964 WHICH READS: "THIS BRINGS TOTAL CREDITS
TO WHICH DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED THE SUM OF
$20,101.93, LESS REFUNDS OF $3,668.71 ,, -::- -:- RESULTS
IN A NET BALANCE CREDIT TO WHICH DEFENDANT
rs ENTITLED TO $16,433.23 OUT OF THE CASH ON HAND
OF $28,723.98, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF FACT
OR BY ANY EVIDENCE.

No mention was rna(fo in the Court's 11wu101andmn
rh·cision of the ''rl1otal credits to whid1 Defendant is
entitled" or "the amount of the refunds to whieh Plaintiff is entitled" or "tlw net balanee credit to which Defendant is entitled." rl1hen~ is not a word of evidence
or Findings of Fact on any one of these items in the
record.

The total credits to which Defendant is entitled,
the amount of refunds due Plaintiff, and the net credit
l1alanc<· to which Defendant is entitled can only Le deter111ined after this Court has ruled on the various items
11f this appeal and cross-appeal.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO Al\IEND THE JUDGMENT OF MARCH 12, 1964.

One provision of the ju<lg1ut>nt of Mardi 12,
reads:

l~.Hi-1:
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''As to Item G of Plaintiff's selwdul<· recpivrd
in evidence as Exhibit P-10, reflecting items totalling $9,819.65, it is ordered and adjudg<•d ilrnt
this amount shall be placed in a special account
75 per cent tlwreof to be paid by the Defendant
and 25 per cent thereof to be paid by the Plaintiff.
That all overcharges to customers of the partnership collected by the partnership for anything
shall be paid from the aforesaid special account.
** * Costs of making such refunds shall be paid out
of said special account. When all refunds have
been made and all costs, deducted, the balance f('maining in said special account shall be paid
one-half thereof to each of the parties." (R. m-62)
1

Appellant's motion was to amend the above provision of the judgment of the Court of March 12, 1964 by
substituting therefor :
"As to Item 6 of Plaintiff's schedule received
in evidence as Exhibit P-10 reflecting items totalling $10,801.61, it is orden~d and adjudged that
this amount shall be placed in a special account,
75 per cent of $9,819.65 plus $981.96 thereof to
be paid by the Defendant and 25 per cent of
$9,819.65 to be paid by the Plaintiff."
Exhibit P-10 showed jtems totalling $9,819.65 plus
a bonus of $918.65 taken by Respondent. It was an obvious mistake or clerical error that tlw amount of
$9,819.65 was written into the judgment and not $9,819.65
plus the bonus of $981.96, a total of $10,801.61, of which
amount Respondent should return 75 per cent of $9,819.65
plus $981.96 into the special a<'count, sine<· it wa:-; tlw
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intent of tlw Court that all moneys received by the> parties
in this matter should be returned into the Court.
Appellant's motion to amend was argued on .July
U, 1965. Before counsel for Appellant made the argu111ent, the Court stated:

"lf there is a typographical mistake, naturally it can be conformed by stipulation of the
parties, but other than that I have heard the ease
and I am not going to make any new - receive
any new evidence or make any different determination." (8upp. R. 3-4)
Coum;el for Appellant then stated:

"It wouldn't make a different determination

and it would not require any evidence***Looking
from the exhibits it can be seen from the exhibit
that that amount is wrong." (Supp. R. +)
The Court then stated:
''Well, Mr. Backman can see it as well as the
Court can, can't he~" (Supp. R. 4)
Upon the conclusion of Appellant's argument, coun~el for Respondent stated:
"I can't understand Mr. Iverson. This is
the first time we will admit and we have discused
it a number of times, and I have followed his
contention and I believe we can work it out. And
if there is an apparent error, we drew the judgment.
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"Mr. l venwn: Ye[';, you drew the jndglllL'llt."
(Supp. R. 6)
At the condm;ion of the hearing the Court stated:

"LT nless .Mr. Backman consents to this arneH<lment, motion to amend this paragraph and so on
then I \Vill deny it." (Supp. H. 7)
'
'l1hereafter Mr.
refuse to agree to
and to make the
obliged to prepare
denying the motion.

Backman would neither agree nor
the order amending the judgment,
matter appealable, Appellant wa~
and have the Court sign the order

This is a unique decision. Counsel for R.espondPnt
admitted Appellant was right. (Supp. R. 6) Yet the
Court denied the petition to amend. The Court at no
time indicated that Appellant was not right. He took
the position that he would grant the amendment if Respondent's counsel would consent thereto, but not otherwise.
The rule against giving relief from judgments unlc::>8
motions are filed in time does not apply to relief from
clerical errors. As lieretofore stated in this brief, tllf'
law on this matter is stated in the case of Frost v:s Di1ltrict Court of Box Elder County, 83 P.2d 737, 96 Utah
lOG. This court quoted with approval from :F'reeman on
.Judgments in Volume 1, Fifth J~~dition, Sc>C'tion 1-n, n~
follows:

;_-U
"As a general rule, unless control over it has
been retained in souw proper manner or a statute
otherwise provides, no final judgment can be
amended after the t<Jrrn at which it was rendered
or after it otherwise becomes a final judgment.
The power of court:-; to correct clerical errors and
misprisons and to make the record speak the truth
lJy n'Ullc pro tiwc amendments after the term does
not <·nable them to cliange their judgments in substance and in material respects."
Can a motion be denied in advance of hearing it
unless tlH• other side stipulates to the Court's granting
the same, and then aftt>r the other side admits that counsel making the motion is rlght, may the Court deny tlw
motion unless opposing counsel will stipulate to the
amendment.
CONCLUSION
'1 he Appellant submits that the law and the evidence require that:
1

1. The award of $2,500.00 to Respondent for presPrving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership be
sr>t aside.
2.
aside.

rrhat the bonus of $535.00 to each partnl'r be set

rrhat the portion of the judgment which finds
the amount of credits to which Respondent is entitled,
which fixes the amount of refunds due Appellant, and
th<· balance credit due Hespomknt be set asidt·, and this
matter returned to the trial court for a new trial.
~).
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4. Appellant's motion to amend the judgment of
March 12, 1964 nunc pro tune be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
.. ., .,._: ; ': ::'
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